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Abstract 
Italy will phase electricity retail price regulation by July 1st, 2020. This is the last step in the process of 
electricity market liberalization, that started in 1999. Until then, residential customers and small 
businesses who do not choose their supplier, will be supplied under a transitional, regulated service 
named “maggior tutela” (greater protection), which is supplied by the local distributor at a price set by 
the regulator. This paper reviews the literature on electricity retail competition – with particular regard 
to its expected effects on prices, innovation and customer engagement – and the condition under which 
its benefits may be delivered. Then a Structure-Conduct-Performance analysis of Italy’s retail electricity 
market for residential customers is performed. Two issues are found to be potentially problematic: 
excessive market concentration and low customer engagement. Energy poverty is also identified as an 
issue to be addressed. A phase-out mechanism is finally proposed, that relies on graduality, asymmetric 
regulation and a mandatory, opt-out collective switching exercise. The mechanism aims to rapidly 
reducing market concentration by leveraging on behavioral incentives to customers still under regulated 
prices to switch to the cheapest supplier. 
Keywords 
Electricity, Competition, Retail Market, Regulation, Energy poverty. 
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1. Introduction* 
Italy’s 2015 Annual Competition Law1 provides for phasing out electricity retail prices regulation by 
July 1st, 2019 (later postponed until July 1st, 2020).2 Until then, while all electricity customers are free 
to choose their supplier, a default option will be available to residential customers and small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs)3, which is provided by the local Distribution System Operator (DSO)4 at a price set 
by the regulator. This scheme, known as “maggior tutela” or “greater protection”, has been in place 
since July 1st, 2007.  
Full liberalization of retail electricity markets is advocated by the EU Commission as an instrument 
to achieve both a greater integration among national markets and as a way to enable all consumers to 
fully participate in the energy transition (EC 2015a, 2015b). As of 2015, end-user price regulation was 
in force in 12 out of 28 EU member states.5 Six of them had already started a roadmap for its repeal.6  
Italy introduced retail electricity choice for all customers in 2007. However, instead of phasing out 
regulated prices, it kept a transitional default option for small customers. Building upon previous 
experience, the country may provide an interesting case study on how to manage retail electricity market 
opening.  
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 first describes 
Italy’s existing price-setting mechanisms, and then proposes a structure-conduct-performance analysis 
of the market. Customer engagement and (potential) market power are identified as the major challenges 
ahead. Section 4 proposes a roadmap for phasing out the regulated regime. Section 5 summarizes and 
concludes. 
Electricity retail competition is comparatively less studied than other features of power systems, such 
as wholesale markets and infrastructure regulation. This paper contributes to the literature in three ways: 
i) it collects evidence on the outcomes of Italy’s market design, which relies upon the co-existence of 
competitive price with a regulated, standard offer; ii) it reviews the existing literature, with particular 
reference to the previous experiences with the phase out of price regulation; iii) it proposes a roadmap 
for the phase out that – if effective – might be replicated in other jurisdictions, particularly within the 
European Union.  
2. Review of the literature 
In principle, competition in product markets is expected to deliver lower prices, better quality and/or 
more innovation to customers. Removing regulatory barriers while introducing smart regulation to 
                                                     
* The views expressed in this work are those of the authors and do not involve the responsibility of the institutions to which 
they belong. We would like to thank Simona Benedettini, David Deller, Ivan Faiella, Stephen Littlechild, Alfredo 
Macchiati, Renato Pesa, Carlo Scarpa, and Catherine Waddams for the comments they made on previous versions of this 
paper. For the same reason we would like to thank the participants to the 2nd AIEE Symposium on “Current and Future 
Challenges to Energy Security”, held in Rome on 2-4 November 2017, and to the workshop “Italy’s National energy 
strategy 2017” (March 14th, 2017). 
1 Law 124/2017. 
2 Decree-Law 91/2018. 
3 Defined as businesses with fewer than 50 employees and a turnover lower than 10 million euro. 
4 131 active suppliers as of Dec. 31st, 2016 (AEEGSI, 2017a) 
5 Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Spain. 
6 Denmark, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Spain. 
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protect customers, especially the vulnerable ones (the so-called “energy poor”) may help to capture the 
benefits from liberalization (Nicoletti et al. 2000, Koske et al. 2015).  
In order to evaluate the consequences of electricity retail liberalization at least two dimensions should 
be considered: prices and innovation.  
With regard to prices, no conclusive evidence has been reached so far. Earlier studies found little or 
no effect on prices in the liberalized markets (for a review, see Joskow 2008), or even an increase of 
prices for small customers. Newbery and Pollitt (1997) found large efficiency gains but they argue that 
they were, by and large, captured by suppliers. More recent studies offer a more nuanced perspective. 
The ECME Consortium (2010) performed a comprehensive study on behalf of the EU Commission, 
finding that: a) the generating portfolio is the most important determinant of the price level for 
households, b) where competition is allowed large gains are available but c) most households fail to take 
full advantage of such opportunities. Such conclusion is confirmed by the British Competition and 
Markets Authority’s investigation on electricity retail markets (CMA 2016) and other studies (see for 
example Waddams and Zhu 2016). Polo and Airoldi (2017) developed a model of the electricity market 
where consumers search for price and firms compete in prices: they found that a) the outcome of retail 
competition on prices strongly depends on the actual and perceived search costs and b) lifting the 
regulated prices may result in higher prices if participation is already high prior to the liberalization (a 
condition that, as we shall see, is not likely to be met in Italy).  
In the US, some studies found little impact of retail competition on prices for residential customers 
(see for example Su 2014), while others argue that competition is associated with lower prices 
(O’Connor 2017), with a greater effect on large customers (Ros 2015). Competition has driven down 
the markup of retail prices over wholesale cost (Swadley and Yücel 2011). 
Since the onset of liberalization, greater innovation was considered a policy goal as important as 
lower prices. Littlechild (2002) argues that competition in retail electricity markets works as a dynamic 
discovery process whereby not just prices, but also a larger value proposition, may be chosen by 
customers. Bundling electricity with other services has been found to be instrumental to increase the 
customers’ involvement in retail markets (Eakin and Faruqui 2000); Italy is no exception under this 
perspective (Stagnaro 2017). Moreover, demand-side response in retail markets appears to be an 
effective means of dealing with demand- and price-spikes in wholesale markets (Rassenti et al. 2002, 
Cooke 2011), especially under real-time pricing regimes (Borenstein and Holland 2005). 
Broadly speaking, competition is more likely to incentivize innovation in the so-called “neck-and-
neck industries”, i.e. industries where firms compete on the same technological level (Aghion et al. 
2014). That seems to be the case of the electricity industry. However, the industry’s regulatory 
framework has been remarkably stable over time, contributing to a slow rate of innovation therein. The 
opening of retail markets was largely induced by changes in the technology, with particular regard to 
generating technologies, smart appliances and electricity networks, which ultimately made previous 
regulatory arrangements outdated (Kiesling 2008).  
The evolution of retail electricity markets currently depends on three technological drivers: i) the 
growing share of small-scale generation technologies, such as rooftop solar panels and other renewables; 
ii) the diffusion of interconnected, smart appliances and energy efficiency technologies; iii) the 
improvement of distribution grids and metering systems, which have increasingly grown as platforms 
that manage data, beyond moving electricity (Kiesling 2010, Kiesling and Munson 2017). The 
development of digital technologies and smart meters and appliances is likely to increase rewards from 
market participation (Chen and Liu 2016, Lavrijssen and Parra 2017). 
A third stream of literature explores why consumers appear comparatively less interested in potential 
savings or better services related to electricity than they are in other public services, such as 
telecommunications. The above-mentioned inquiry by the CMA (2016) argues that large potential gains 
go wasted because of the consumers’ failure to switch to a cheaper tariff. It also suggests that consumer 
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inertia may lay the basis for unilateral market power to be exercised by (local) incumbents, insofar as it 
allows them to price-discriminate against the least active consumers. That might apply to the Italian 
market, too (Aeegsi 2017a). According to Grubb (2015), the customer’s failure to choose the best offer 
may be exacerbated by the supplier’s opportunistic behavior. Hence he suggests that potential regulatory 
solutions may include: “simplifying the choice environment, for instance by restricting price to be a 
scalar; advising consumers of their expected costs under each option; or choosing on behalf of 
consumers”. However, the CMA (2016) itself found that regulations simplifying the choice did not 
contribute to improve the consumers’ ability to choose, while they may have resulted in adverse 
consequences making the most convenient offers no longer available. By the same token, Acer (2016) 
shows that regulatory limits to the freedom of choice, price regulations, or standard (default) offers may 
lead to further disengagement. Von der Fehr and Hansen (2010) found similar results in Norway, 
showing that liberalization was successful in creating better opportunities for consumers, but at the same 
time only the most active customers captured the benefits, whereas it is not clear whether the less active 
consumers had a real gain.  
CEER (2016) identified four main reasons for consumer inertia: insufficient (perceived) monetary 
gain, lack of trust, complex switching procedures, and loyalty to the previous supplier, the first three 
being the result of market disruptions. Crampes and Waddams (2017) suggested to “automate” the 
switching process, either through third-party intermediaries or forms of competition for the market, in 
order to capture the best of the two aspects of retail competition and price regulation. We will build 
upon their proposal later in this paper. 
3. An analysis of Italy’s retail electricity market 
3.1. Price-setting mechanisms 
Under the Italian law, all electricity customers have been free to choose their supplier since July 1st, 
2007 (July 1st, 2004 for non-residential customers). Residential consumers and small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) who have not chosen – or do not want to choose – their supplier are supplied by the 
local DSO under a transitional scheme called “maggior tutela”. Under such regime: 
 the commercial counterpart of the consumers is a legally-unbundled company belonging to the 
same conglomerate as the local DSO (the largest DSO supplies about 86.5% of the customers 
under a regulated tariff); 
 the contractual features are standardized and set by the energy regulator; 
 the price is set by the regulator, based upon the costs incurred by Acquirente Unico (“Single 
Buyer”) in the wholesale markets. Acquirente Unico is a state-owned company in charge of 
procuring electricity, through a mix of spot and long-term contracts; 
 in order to match the costs of competitors and not displace competition, the wholesale cost of 
Acquirente Unico is topped by a certain amount, set by the regulator in order to match the supposed 
entry and operating costs of an “efficient” new entrant. Such amount corresponded to 8.47% of 
the final price for a household consuming 2,700 kWh/year in Q4-2017. 
The maggior tutela has been challenged before the EU Court of Justice, that found it compliant with the 
EU law as long as: i) the resulting prices are equivalent to market prices, with regard to both their level 
(i.e. electricity should not be priced below costs) and the price-formation mechanism; ii) the scheme is 
transitional.7  
The maggior tutela shares many features of traditional price-regulation. Italy’s energy regulator 
qualifies it as a form of price-control (AEEGSI 2017b, p.4), whereas ACER (2016, p.48) calls it a “price-
                                                     
7 See infringement procedures no. 2006/2057 and the Judgement of the EU Court of Justice no.C-265/08.  
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setting intervention”. As such, it may distort the market in several ways, including (but not limited to) 
working as a focal point8 for competitors in the free market and generating a “feel-safe effect” whereby 
customers feel as if they were more protected under the regulated regime (ACER 2015, 2016). Even its 
name – maggior tutela (“greater protection”) – further discourages switching, by nudging customers 
away from the free market. Behavioral economics has shown how important setting the default option 
and giving the appropriate names to the available choices is in shaping the economic agents’ actual 
behavior (Thaler and Sunstein 2003): when faced with the widespread evidence that small customers of 
electricity have a tendency towards inertia, Italy’s retail market design seems likely to make them even 
less, and not more, active. 
Not surprisingly, about six out of ten residential customers and half of SMEs are still supplied under 
the regulated regime, even though the share of consumers supplied under the free market has been 
steadily growing since 2007 (Arera 2018a, 2018b). Moreover, there is evidence that more energy-
intensive customers tend to switch to a tariff under the free market (AEEGSI 2017a, ARERA 2018b).  
3.2. Structure-Conduct-Performance 
3.2.1. The analytical framework 
In order to make an assessment of the progress of retail electricity market opening in the EU member 
states, the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) asked the consultancy firm IPA 
to develop a synthetic indicator named Acer Retail Competition Index, or Arci (IPA 2015). The 
underlying analysis follows the structure-conduct-performance paradigm (SCP) (Bain 1968), which is 
frequently used in antitrust analysis (Weiss 1979, Hovenkamp 1985), including the electricity sector 
(Weiss 2006). This paradigm has been strongly criticized for not being able to capture the long-term 
contribution of technological progress to competition and, more generally, for the assumption that 
market structure determines the agents’ behavior which, in turns, results in the market performance, 
whereas the conduct may in fact retroact on the market structure (Stigler 1983, Schmalensee 1989).  
Despite its shortcomings, SCP may be applied – and conveys useful information – when i) the focus 
is largely on short-term developments of a market (such is the case under discussion) and ii) market 
structure is a dominant issue as compared to conduct. This may be the case of a market opening processes 
whereby the starting point resembles a form of monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic competition. Hence, 
we will follow IPA (2015) and employ the SCP approach to assess the situation of Italy’s retail 
electricity market on the hedge of liberalization. 
To begin with, we present the results of IPA’s Acer Retail Competition Index (IPA 2015), which 
ranks the EU member states according to how effective retail competition is. In Figure 1, the score of 
each country is broken down into its components.  
  
                                                     
8 To this extent, it is remarkable that many offers in the free market are priced at a discount with respect to the price in the 
regulated regime. 
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Figure 1. Acer Retail Competition Index scores. Source: IPA (2015) 
 
As it is evident from the chart, Italy performs relatively well in the overall indicator, ranking as the 5th 
most open retail electricity market among the surveyed countries (EU member states plus Norway). IPA 
analysis takes into consideration the following variables: CR3 (i.e. the joint market shares of the three 
largest suppliers); number of nationwide suppliers; annual rate of entry-exit; switching activity (i.e. how 
active the active customers are); share of non-switchers (i.e. how large the group of disengaged 
customers is); ability to compare price easily; number of offers per supplier; price dispersion; customer 
satisfaction (measured through surveys on whether markets meet the customers’ expectations); average 
mark-up of suppliers (Table 1). As we shall see, more detailed information confirms that Italy performs 
well in general, but competition may be hindered as emphasized by high concentration rates and 
relatively low switching activity.  
Table 1. Components of IPA’s Acer Retail Competition Index 
Structure Conduct Performance 
Concentration: 
CR3 
Number of suppliers 
 
Barriers: 
Price comparability 
Entry/Exit activity: 
Annual entry/exit rates 
 
Switching: 
Annual switching rates (tariff and 
supplier) 
% of non-switcher 
 
Innovation: 
Number of offers per supplier 
Prices: 
Price dispersion 
 
Quality: 
Does the market meet expectations? 
 
Costs and margins: 
Average annual markup 
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3.2.2. Structure9 
Most of the 29.5 million residential customers in Italy are supplied under the regulated regime (61.2% 
in 2017, down from 79% in 2012). Of these, about 86.5% are supplied by the largest operator and former 
monopolist (Enel). Among the customers who have chosen their supplier, the same operator claims a 
market share of about half. Overall, in 2017 the incumbent supplied 41,699 GWh to residential 
customers, vis-a-vis a total demand of 57,751 GWh (72.2%, about one percentage point below the 
previous year). The second largest operator, Eni, had a market share of 5.6%, and the third one, Acea, 
3.4%. Hence, the joint market share of the three largest operators (CR3) in the retail electricity market 
is as high as 86.3%. 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) in 2017 was around 2,800 if only the free market is 
considered, but it increased up to about 5,600 if the regulated regime is included, indicating a highly 
concentrated market. The situation is not significantly different if concentration indexes are computed 
with regard to the number of customers rather than to the volumes of traded electricity. Since the 
maggior tutela works as a default option for those who have never switched, it can be argued that high 
market concentration is not a bug of market functioning, but a feature of market design. 
Despite high concentration ratios, the market is attracting an increasing number of operators. In 2016, 
373 conglomerate suppliers were in operation, up from 219 in 2012. Of them, 126 were active in at least 
16 regions (out of 20), while 71 had customers in just one region. The share of nation-wide operators 
increased from 29% in 2012 to 34% in 2016, whereas the share of local suppliers decreased from 27% 
to 19% in the same period.  
As far as price comparability is concerned, the EU’s Consumer Market Scoreboard – which mixes 
perception indicators with hard data on complaints and problems – suggests that the ability of the Italian 
customers to compare alternative offers is slightly below the EU average, but the situation has been 
consistently improving over time (EC 2016) (Table 2).  
Table 2. Results from the Consumer Market Scoreboard for electricity 
 Italy’s Score 2015 Difference w/ 2013 Difference w/ EU avg 
Comparability (avg) 6.2 +0.6 -0.5 
Trust (avg) 6.1 +1.1 -0.6 
Problems (%) 13.4 -1.1 +2.5 
Complaints (%) 80.2 -7.3 -2.4 
Expectations (avg) 7.6 +0.8 -0.1 
Electricity (overall score) 
71.8 +6.4 -3.5 
Source: elaboration on DG Just data. Note: Comparability = average score from consumer survey on price 
comparability (min: 1; max:10); Trust: average score from consumer survey on trust in the suppliers’ commercial 
behavior (1-10); Problems = % of consumers who had at least one problem in the previous year; Complaints = % 
of consumers who filed at least one complaint in the previous year; Expectations = average score from consumer 
survey on whether the service met expectations (1-10) 
3.2.3. Conduct 
As shown by the high number of active suppliers and their steep increase year-on-year, entry barriers 
are relatively low in Italy and new entrants seem to believe there is room to compete either on prices or 
                                                     
9 The source for the data in the discussion below, unless otherwise specified, is Italy’s energy regulator (Aeegsi 2017a, 
2017b, 2017c, 2017d; Arera 2018a, 2018b).  
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on the quality of the service with the incumbents. However, small market shares suggest that gaining 
momentum may be hard.  
On the demand side, the situation is more puzzling. On one hand, switching rates are higher than the 
EU average, even though they remain below the levels of the most dynamic markets. In 2016, 13.7% of 
residential customers changed tariff or supplier (up from 10.4% in 2012). Of these, 6.9% switched 
supplier in the free market, 2.9% remained with the same supplier but switched tariff, 3.3% left the 
maggior tutela and 0.6% returned back to the regulated regime. The growth rate of customers supplied 
under the free market (as opposed to those under regulated tariffs) declined, and so did the share of 
customers who switched back to the maggior tutela. In 2017, the switching rate was as high as 12.4%: 
7.7% switched supplier in the free market, 4.5% left the maggior tutela while 0.2% switched back to 
the regulated tariff – a record low level.  
The share of non-switchers declined from 89.6% in 2012 to 87.6% in 2017.  
3.2.4. Performance 
In order to evaluate the market performance, IPA (2015) takes into consideration price dispersion, the 
gap between expectations and actual service, and the dynamics of the average markup. We will not 
touch upon expectations because we already mentioned them in the context of the discussion on the 
quality of the service in Section 3.2.2. 
To begin with, price dispersion should be viewed with a bit of caution. A high price dispersion might 
either suggest that competing supplier are striving to differentiate the product (in which case it is a sign 
of innovation) or that suppliers are able to price-discriminate against the least active consumers (in 
which case it may imply an exercise of market power). Electricity has some features of a commodity, 
hence one would expect that the more effective competition is, the more prices converge towards 
marginal costs. At the same time, electricity retailers are devoting time and effort to differentiate their 
products by moving their value propositions away from the commodity, and towards a more 
sophisticated service.  
In October 2016, the expected annual expenditure on electricity for a representative household10 was 
estimated by the regulator in the range between 479.7-574.1 euro for variable price offers and 450.1-
598.3 euro for fixed price offers, with a weighted average of, respectively, 493.0 and 527.7 euro/year. 
This is equivalent to almost 2% of household total expenditure on average, whereas heating expenditure 
is almost 3% (Figure 2). The Trova Offerte – a price-comparison website set up by the regulator, to 
which suppliers may voluntarily submit their offers – had 48 available offers in the capital city in 
October 2016, up from 26 in October 2014. 
  
                                                     
10 Defined by Italy’s energy regulator as an household with a 3 kW connected load and an annual consumption of 2,700 kWh.  
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Figure 2. Percentage of the average income spent on electricity and heating. Source: Faiella et al. 
(2017) 
 
IPA (2015) estimates the mark-up as the difference between retail and wholesale prices and finds it in 
Italy to be in line with the EU average. Figures 3 and 4 show alternative estimates, which rely on the 
difference between retail prices for households and large industrial customers as a proxy for markups. 
Intuitively, large industrial customers have a greater bargaining power and can take better advantage of 
liberalization than small consumers (Joskow 2008). Under this metric, Italy seems to have an average 
markup in the second half of 2017 which is relatively low as compared with other EU member states 
(Figure 3) (in reading Figure 3, one should take into consideration that some countries with very low 
mark-ups do regulate prices for residential customers below costs11 or very close to them). Figure 4 
shows that average mark-ups in Italy tended to slightly increase in 2010-2017: that may be due either to 
the exercise of market power or to the changing nature of the electricity service which is increasingly 
bundled with additional components (while that is unlikely to be the case for large industrial customers) 
(see also Acer 2016 on this).  
  
                                                     
11 That was the case, in particular, for Latvia, Romania and Lithuania. See Acer (2016).  
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Figure 3. European mark-ups in the second semester of 2017 computed as difference between 
retail prices for residential customers (1,000 kWh < consumption < 2,500 kWh) and large 
industrial customers (20,000 MWh < consumption < 70,000 MWh). Source: elaboration on 
Eurostat data 
 
Figure 4. Italian mark-ups over time computed as difference between retail prices for residential 
customers (1,000 kWh < consumption < 2,500 kWh) and large industrial customers (20,000 
MWh < consumption < 70,000 MWh). Source: elaboration on Eurostat data. 
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3.2.5. Summary 
Two major challenges emerge from the structure-conduct-performance analysis of Italy’s retail 
electricity market: high concentration and low customer engagement. As far as market concentration is 
concerned, the “free market” – where customers have switched at least once – is relatively concentrated 
but consumers seem on average able and willing to take advantage of the opportunity to choose their 
preferred tariffs. However, a majority of residential customers are still supplied under the regulated 
regime, which is, by design, supplied by vertically integrated incumbents. The largest operator has a 
market share of 86.5% in the regulated market, which translates into an overall market share of above 
72%.  
This makes the incumbent potentially able to exercise market power, especially in such a delicate 
moment as the transition towards full liberalization. High concentration may be a cause of customer 
inertia, and customer inertia tends to keep high the incumbent’s market share. Being unable to capture 
economies of scale and scope and facing high costs to acquire new customers, competitors may be 
ineffective in challenging the incumbent, especially when it comes to the least engaged customers. As a 
consequence, the combination between the small size of the competitors and the customer inertia may 
result in a greater ability for the incumbent to price-discriminate and to protect its market share. High 
market concentration is not, prima facie, the result of market abuses, but derives from regulatory choices 
that were made at the time of initial market opening, and that have not been properly addressed in the 
following years. Hence, a regulatory solution should be developed.  
In the following section we will focus on the supply side, hence we will not deal directly with demand 
engagement, except to the extent that promoting demand engagement is instrumental to achieve lower 
market concentrations in the short run.  
On top of this, vulnerable customers have a right to improved (and targeted) protection, both under 
the European and Italian law. We will briefly discuss the issue of energy poverty, on which a rich flow 
of literature is developing (see, for example, Amenta and Lavecchia, 2017, Faiella and Lavecchia 2015, 
Faiella et al. 2017, Miniaci et al. 2014), providing an analysis and a proposal.  
4. A policy proposal to achieve full liberalization 
4.1. How to address the market concentration… 
In this section, we propose a roadmap to phase out the regulated tariff in Italy, while addressing the 
potential sources of market power and frictions to the consumers’ detriment. As we have showed, there 
are issues both on the demand- and the supply-side, namely customer inertia and market concentration, 
respectively.  
As far as the former is concerned, policies may be developed that rely on: i) the expected behavioral 
responses to the way information is provided or default options are set; ii) increasing price transparency 
and comparability; iii) creating a framework that makes more easily accessible to competitors the 
information about disengaged customers. Several proposals are included in the CMA report on the 
British market (CMA 2016) and few of them are detailed in Stagnaro et al. (2017a).  
In this paper we will focus on market concentration. To some extent our proposals provide an answer 
to customer disengagement, too, but they are not intended as a solution for that specific problem, nor 
should they be understood as a long-term response thereof. Our idea aims to ensure an ordered phase 
out of the regulated tariff. We believe that – given the current situation – public policies should be aimed 
at fostering competition by intervening both on market design and market structure (Stagnaro et al. 
2017a, 2017b, 2018). 
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The liberalization process of Italy’s wholesale electricity market was successful because, among the 
other reasons, since the onset of the reform, the incumbent was required to release generation capacity 
(De Paoli and Gullì 2010). By the same token, in the natural gas market – where the concentration 
bottleneck was higher in the supply chain – the incumbent was repeatedly obliged to release either 
volumes of natural gas or transit capacity, as well as to stick to an antitrust ceiling on natural gas imports 
(Beccarello and Piron 2008). This kind of asymmetric regulation, whereby the incumbent is put under 
specific constraints that do not apply to the other competitors, has been often used in several sectors and 
proved to be successful (Abel and Clements 2001, Baranes and Vuong 2011). The rationale behind 
asymmetric regulation lies in: i) removing undue advantages that the incumbent may have; ii) preventing 
the incumbent to pursue opportunistic behaviors that may result in raising the rivals’ costs; iii) speeding 
up the process of creating sizable competitors.  
However effective, asymmetric regulation falls short when it comes to getting the customers involved 
in the process. At the same time, placing an obligation on the incumbent to reduce its market share may 
still leave room for opportunistic behaviors: for example, cream skimming.  
Our policy proposal relies on three pillars. 
The first pillar is graduality: it took time for the market to develop and it will take time for both 
customers and suppliers to become accustomed to the rules of the game. The idea that a mere change in 
the regulations will immediately result in dramatically different behaviors is naïve. Both customers and 
suppliers will need time to gain confidence and to develop trust in each other. We propose to provide 
for a 3-years long transition period, starting on July 1st, 2020.  
The second pillar is asymmetric regulation. We propose that, during the above-mentioned transition 
period: 
 customers who are supplied under the maggior tutela by July 1st, 2020 are still supplied by the 
incumbent under a standardized contract, whereby price variations should be approved by the 
regulator, in order to mimic the functioning of the regulated regime (of course they can switch to 
a different tariff or supplier at any point in time, both before and after July 1st, 2020);  
 during this period, an antitrust ceiling on the largest supplier is introduced, which will decrease 
over time (for example, the incumbent should reduce its market share below 60% by the end of 
the first year, below 50% by the end of the second year, and below 40% by the end of the third 
year);  
 if the incumbent’s market share exceeds the ceiling, it will be forced to divest according to a 
procedure that we describe below – what we call the mandatory, opt-out collective switching 
scheme. 
The third pillar introduces a mandatory, opt-out collective switching scheme. As we have seen: i) until 
July 1st, 2020 those who do not choose a supplier are supplied under a regulated tariff by local DSO; ii) 
we have no information on the drivers of the customers’ choice not to switch to free market: they may 
not be aware that there are potentially significant gain from switching, or they may be just satisfied with 
their supplier. While the former ones are properly inactive customers, the latter can be regarded as 
customers who actively “choose not to choose”. The reason why it is not possible to discriminate truly 
inactive customers from “active inactivity” lies in the way the default option is defined: inaction results 
in staying with the incumbent, regardless to its underlying reasons. Our proposal is then to turn inactivity 
into a driver for switching. That follows a behavioral approach that has already been successfully applied 
in other areas such as saving plans (Thaler and Benartzi 2004). We follow the proposal set out by 
Crampes and Waddams (2017) of organizing an opt-out collective switching. We also take advantage 
of the municipal aggregation scheme adopted in Ohio (Littlechild 2008) and the evidence from the 
British experience with the so-called Big Switch (Deller et al. 2014). 
If the policy goal is that of creating an incentive for customers to switch, and if the reason why they 
fail to do so spontaneously is inertia, then – intuitively – one may achieve the desired outcome by 
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designing a scheme whereby inertia leads to switching. Those who really want to maintain the existing 
relationship with the incumbent will be required to take action, by revealing their preferences.  
Assume, for example, that by the end of the first year of the transitional period (December 31st, 2020), 
the incumbent still holds a 65% market share, vis-a-vis a 60% antitrust ceiling. If that happens, the 
energy regulator and the competition authority will set up a collective switching procedure that involves 
about 5% of the customer basis, randomly chosen among those who were initially supplied under the 
regulated regime (and who are supplied by the national incumbent under a standardized contract at this 
point in time). Such customers would be given a right to opt out. The new supplier would be identified 
through one or more auctions, which are intended to select the supplier(s) able to offer the best deal.  
Those customers who are happy with the incumbent are likely to opt out and actively exercise their 
will; others would just be moved and will become supplied by a competitor under a lower tariff. The 
information accrued by this process will be used for the sake of fine-tuning the following auctions. The 
opt-out collective switching exercise should be repeated at least once per year, and possibly more often, 
for the entire transition period, until the desired market concentration is achieved. Moreover, each group 
of customers that is enrolled in the scheme should be small enough to allow for a wide participation in 
the auctions, resulting in lower tariffs and preventing potential collusion among the participants.  
Finally, by the end of the third year (which coincides with the end of the transitional period, or 
December 31st, 2022)), antitrust ceilings would expire. However, it is likely that some customers will 
still be supplied by the incumbent (as well as by other smaller vertically integrated companies) not out 
of choice, but merely out of inactiveness.  
In order to give these customers a chance to take advantage from liberalization, a final collective 
switching will take place, that involves all those customers who were moved from the regulated regime 
to the standard contract, and who did never choose a different supplier or tariff (including both the 
national and local incumbents). Again, an opt-out clause will be introduced in order to allow those who 
are happy with the historical supplier to actively show their preference vis-a-vis the opportunity of 
saving money off their electricity bill or getting a better service.  
Figure 4 shows a potential evolution of market shares over time, under a set of conservative 
assumptions regarding the degree of customer engagement. 
Figure 4. Potential evolution of market shares under the proposed mechanism 
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not the long-term aim of the proposals. If a large part of Italian customers will still be proven as 
unengaged as they have been until now, then ad-hoc policies may be developed, including repeating this 
kind of opt-out collective switching schemes. However, this decision will have to be made after the 
transition period is ended, and provided that strong evidence is collected that the demand-side still fails 
to capture the potential gains from competition. 
4.2… while ensuring the right protection to vulnerable customers 
The alleged rationale behind the regulated regime is to ensure an adequate protection for vulnerable 
consumers. However, despite a decade-long effort to tackle energy poverty, the existing instruments, 
including the regulated regime, have not proven effective (Faiella and Lavecchia 2015). Energy-poor 
households are estimated to be around 2 million (Amenta and Lavecchia 2017) and increasing (Faiella 
et al. 2017).  
A new approach is required. In the 2017 National Energy Strategy (MISE 2017), the Italian 
Government called for a comprehensive strategy to tackle energy poverty based on: 1) the adoption of 
an official definition and a national measure; 2) a thorough review of the existing policies; 3) the creation 
of an Italian Energy Poverty Observatory which will work in coordination with the European Energy 
Poverty Observatory. Moreover, a new conditional cash transfer program, the Bonus Energia, might be 
put in place, with the following characteristics: 
1. one program, substituting all the existing measures (and particularly the Bonus Elettrico and 
Bonus Gas, under which low-income households enjoy a discount on the annual expenditure for 
electricity and natural gas, respectively); 
2. unique eligibility condition, based on the national equivalized household income and wealth 
measure (ISEE); 
3. the value depends on the household’s size and on the ISEE (with a cut-off after a chosen 
threshold);  
4. the maximum benefit should cover up to one quarter of energy expenditure covering, ideally, 
winter heating or summer cooling costs. 
Full liberalization of the retail market and an enhanced (and more targeted) protection of vulnerable 
consumers may be complementary processes which should be carried on jointly. A more detailed 
proposal is offered by Lavecchia and Stagnaro (2018). 
5. Conclusion 
Retail competition in electricity may deliver significant benefits to consumers, who may also experience 
higher gains as technology develops. The ability of customers to reap the benefits – in the form of lower 
tariffs and/or innovative products – depends critically on the effective competition between suppliers 
and active engagement on the demand side. The former, in turn, relies on sound market design and 
structure.  
This paper focused on the phase-out of regulated tariffs in Italy, which is due by July 1st, 2020. Choice 
has been introduced since July 1st, 2007, but the “free market” option has coexisted ever since with a 
“transitional” regulated tariff – the maggior tutela – that still covers a majority of the residential 
customers and slightly less than half of the SMEs. Since the maggior tutela is supplied by vertically 
integrated incumbents, with the largest one covering over four fifth of the points of delivery, the market 
is extremely concentrated by design. Consequently, in pursuing full liberalization, market concentration 
is a major issue. Another issue that needs to be addressed is customer engagement: while a minority of 
customers appear very active in the market, many others are not, especially those who have never 
switched supplier since 2007, who may even not know that they have a right to choose a different tariff.  
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A structure-conduct-performance analysis of the Italian market confirms that high market concentration 
and insufficient customer engagement should be addressed. Other indicators – such as entry/exit activity, 
price dispersion, customer satisfaction, service quality, etc. – have been consistently improving over 
time. Therefore, we propose a scheme that would simultaneously result in lower concentration and 
would turn consumer inertia into lower tariffs from an alternative supplier, rather than an opportunity to 
exercise market power. Our proposal combines decreasing and transitional antitrust ceilings – that would 
reduce the incumbent’s market share from the current 72% down to 40% over a three-year period – with 
a repeated collective switching exercise, under which customers would be left free to opt-out. As a 
result, disengaged customers would be automatically moved to a cheaper tariff, whereas those who make 
an explicit choice of not switching would remain with their current supplier. In a nutshell, the basic idea 
is that of turning the default option from “stay” to “switch”. The phase-out of price regulation should 
also be accompanied by a comprehensive reform of the existing tools to fight energy poverty, in order 
to provide an effective support to those low-income households who may have troubles in paying their 
bills.  
Our proposal does not cover other relevant issues, including (but not limited to) customer 
engagement, information campaigns and promoting price comparison websites. More research is needed 
on these issues and many details should be explored in more depth. However, this proposal may serve 
as a starting point to design a feasible transition that puts customer empowerment at its core.  
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